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In Representing Justice, Judith  Resnik  and  Dennis  Curtis  highlight-
indeed,  speak movingly-of the  shift  from  the  "pageantry  and  spectacle
('rites')  entailed  in  Renaissance  adjudication,"  to  the  "entitlements
('rights')  to processes of a certain kinds  that entailed making  courts open
to  anyone  who  wanted  to  watch."'  The  transformation  from  "rites"  to
"rights"  is a process  rightly celebrated, but, as the authors  caution,  in the
modem American  legal environment,  it is at risk of backsliding.  My  talk
illustrates  one  aspect  of  this  phenomenon,  from  the  modest  colonial
courthouses,  in  which  American  jurors  enforced  (or  not  infrequently,
rejected)  English  law,  to the  modern  federal courthouses,  where  the jury
deliberation  rooms stand empty.
Colonial criminal jury trials involved  far more than rituals that reflected
the  administration  of power,  although they were  surely  that. On  the one
hand, they made transparent  the acts of the state  in imposing  its ultimate
authority  over  the  individual,  the  authority  to  punish,  to  take  away  an
individual's  liberty,  even  their  life.  On  the  other  hand,  the  colonial
citizenry  was invited in not merely to be passive observers. They-at least
the  white  men  with  property  among  them-were  decisionmakers,
members  of a twelve-person  lay jury.  Courthouses  had to  be configured
not only to make trials open, but also to permit space  for the deliberating
jury.2
But the  colonial  criminal jury  had significance  beyond  the  fact that it
introduced  lay  voices  into  the  criminal  justice  system.  The  colonial
criminal jury framed expectations  about colonial power in particular,  not
just governmental power in general. The physical  location of the trial was
critical,  in  an American courthouse  some  distance  from  the  seat  of the
*  Visiting  Lecturer  in  Law at  Yale  Law  School  and  former  United  States  federal  judge  for  the
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1.  JUDITH  RESNIK  & DENNIS  CURTIS,  REPRESENTING  JUSTICE: INVENTION,  CONTROVERSY,  AND
RIGHTS  IN CITY-STATES  AND DEMOCRATIC  COURTROOMS  288 (2011).
2.  See id. at  136-37
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occupying  power,  England. Equally  critical  was  the  identity  of  the
decisionmakers;  the  jury  comprised  not just  of representatives  of the
governed, as  in any polity,  but representatives  of the American colonies.
The most high-profile  case,  such as the trial of the British soldiers for the
deaths  in  the  "Boston  Massacre,"  to  the  least  well  known,  served  to
underscore the jury's substantial authority.
It  was  no  surprise  then  that  the  Constitution  reflected  a  uniquely
powerful  role  for  the jury.  It  was,  as  Akhil  Amar  describes,  a  critical
component  of a  representative  government.  Initially  a colonial  bulwark
against royal authority,  it continued as a uniquely populist and  local voice
in  an  independent  republic.  "[A]  permanent  government  official,  even
an.  . . Article III judge," was not seen  as adequate to "safeguard  liberty."'
In  significant  ways,  however,  the  institution  that  played  this  role  in
colonial  and post-independence  America  was a different  institution than
the one we know today.  The colonial jury was far more than just another
dispute  resolver. It was a  de facto and de jure sentencer;4  it was a robust
institution  fully  expected  to  mitigate  the  harsh  effects  of  the  law  in
individual cases.
Colonial  juries  were  fully  aware  of  the  implications  of  their
verdicts.  Since  most  serious  offenses  were  capital  crimes,  the
jury's  determination  of  guilt  had  specific  and  well-known
consequences.  Indeed,  according  to  some  scholars,  the jury was
permitted-even  encouraged-to  find both  the  facts and the  law.
While  the  judge  formally  imposed  the  sentence,  the  jury's
judgment was  often  outcome-determinative.  What  we  understand
today to be jury nullification was what they understood to be their
role,  a  role  Professor  Rachel  Barkow  describes  as  acting  as  a
check  on  overinclusive  or overly  rigid criminal  laws,  effectively
mitigating  or  tempering  the  law  in  an  individual  case.  [And
k]nowing what they did about punishments  enabled them to fulfill
their constitutional responsibility.'
Courthouses had to provide space for the powerful juries-the venire of
prospective  jurors  from  which  the  petit jury  was  chosen,  the  rows  of
chairs  for  the  twelve  decisionmakers  in  the  courtroom  itself,  the
3.  Akhil  Reed  Amar,  The  Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100  YALE  L.J.  1131,  1185  (1991).
Amar  notes  that  the  jury  was  a  "political  . . . institution."  Id.  at  1188  (quoting  ALEXIS  DE
TOQUEVILLE,  DEMOCRACY  IN AMERICA  293  (Vintage  1945)  (1835)).  The  Legislature  was charged
with making the laws,  the judicial  branch with implementing them. Id. But the latter was bicameral-
the judge like the upper house of a legislature,  the jury like  the lower  (the "democratic  branch of the
judiciary power"). Id. at 1189 (internal  quotation marks omitted).
4.  See Nancy  Gertner, Juries and Originalism:  Giving "Intelligible Content" to the Right to  a
Jury Trial,  71  OHIO ST. L.J. 935, 939 (2010).
5.  Id. at 937  (citing Rachel  E. Barkow, Recharging  the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152  U. PA. L. REv.  33,  36 (2003)).
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deliberations  room, separate and apart from the courtroom.6  In the John J.
Moakley  Federal  Courthouse  in  the  District  of  Massachusetts,  for
example,  each  courtroom  has  four  equal  sized  arches,  signifying  four
equally  important actors  in the justice system-the  public, the judge, the
jury,  the  witness.  Each  judge  has  her  or  his  own  deliberation  room  set
aside for the jury.
More  and  more,  however,  the  "right"  to  a  jury  trial  has  become  a
hollow "rite."  The modem jury  is "only a  shadow of its former self,"  a far
less robust and less powerful  institution than the colonial jury.7  A  variety
of reasons  have  been  cited  to  explain  the  change,  including  the jury's
more  diverse  composition,  the  professionalization  of  the  bar,  and  the
demands  of urbanization.  Colonial jurors  came  from  a  very  narrow and
relatively  informed  elite,  picked  from  the  rolls  of  white  men  with
property;  in  some instances they were  selected precisely  because  of what
they  knew  about the  case  or  their  special  competence.'  After  the  Civil
War, however, barriers  to jury  service were  lifted when  the suffrage was
extended; property  restrictions  ended  as did overt  discrimination  against
minorities  and  women.  A  professional  class  of  judges  and  lawyers
evolved  as  literacy  expanded  and  education  became  more  generally
available.  Over time, the power of the lay jury declined. Mechanisms  for
jury  selection  sought to  insure  that  the jury would  be  selected  in  direct
proportion to what they did not know about the issues or the parties. And
finding such jurors was not too difficult  in an urbanizing, more and more
heterogeneous country.  In effect, "juries became  more and  more passive,
deferring  to  the  professional judge  at trial  when  they  were  admonished
that they had to follow the judge's instructions on the law."9
Now,  jurors  were  instructed  that their  job  was  "only"  to  find  facts;
judges determined  the applicable  law. Jury "nullification,"  while a fact of
life  in  colonial  America,  was  expressly  rejected.  A  judge  was  not
permitted to instruct the jury of its power to nullify.'o
Plea bargaining  further  diminished  the  criminal jury's role;  fewer  and
6.  See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra  note 1, at  136-37.
7.  Amar, supra  note 3, at 1191.
8.  See  Douglas  G.  Smith,  The  Historical and Constitutional Contexts  of Jury  Reform,  25
HOFSTRA L. REV.  377, 432-34 (1996).
9.  Gertner, supra note 4,  at 942 (citations omitted).
10.  See United States v. Edwards,  101 F.3d 17  (2d Cir.  1996) (rejecting  the defendant's argument
that  the  district court  erred in denying  request  for a jury  nullification  instruction);  United  States  v.
Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir.  1996) ("An unreasonable jury verdict, although unreviewable if it is
an acquittal,  is lawless,  and the  defendant  has no  right to invite the jury  to act lawlessly.");  United
States  v.  Sepulveda,  15  F.3d  1161,  1190  (1st  Cir.  1993)  ("Though jury  nullification  has a  long and
sometimes  storied  past, the  case  law makes  plain  that a judge  may  not  instruct  the jury  anent  its
history, vitality,  or  use."  (citation  omitted));  United States  v. Dougherty,  473  F.2d  1113  (D.C.  Cir.
1972)  (holding that the district  court's refusal  to instruct the jury of its  power to  acquit defendants
without regard to the law and evidence was not improper).
435 2012]
3
Gertner: From "Rites" to "Rights"
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012Yale Journal  of Law & the Humanities
fewer jury trials were held in criminal cases. The vast majority of criminal
cases  were resolved without a  public trial, jury or jury waived.  In effect,
plea  bargaining  introduced  private  ordering  into  the  criminal  justice
system,  a  behind-the-curtain  negotiation  about  charges  and  even
outcomes. The result of those negotiations surfaced in an open proceeding
only  when  the judge  took the  defendant's  guilty plea  and  imposed  the
sentence.  By  the  1980s,  with  the  advent  of  mandatory  minimum
sentencing  and  mandatory  guidelines,  prosecutors  gained  the  de  facto
power  to  constrain  an  outcome  based  on the  charges  they  selected,  in
effect bypassing both judge and jury."
By  the turn of this century, the plea rate was at  97.1%.12  Since the best
way  to  escape  a  mandatory  punishment  in  the  federal  system  was  to
cooperate with the government,  the system created incentives for pleading
guilty  as  early  as  possible.  Cooperation  depended  on  the  government's
determination  that  the  defendant's  assistance  was  "substantial.""  The
earlier  in  the  process  the  defendant  provided  information,  especially
against  codefendants,  the  better  the  chance  of  earning  that  benefit.
Although  many aspects  of the criminal justice  system  have suffered  as a
result-e.g.,  effective  assistance  of counsel,  meaningful  discovery-the
greatest casualty, in my judgment, is the jury trial.14
To the extent there was any public ceremony at all, after the defendant's
initial  appearance  to  answer  criminal  charges,  it  occurred  at  the  guilty
plea colloquy  and then the sentencing.  Too  often the former was  nothing
more than  a ritualized  question-and-answer  session,  rarely reflecting  the
real pressures on the defendant to give up his rights to trial.15 A waiver of
a  criminal  jury  trial  was  seen  as  voluntary  notwithstanding  the
extraordinary pressures of onerous mandatory minimum punishments and
the rush to cooperate. Except for the right to counsel,  all other procedural
11.  See  Nancy  Gertner,  Circumventing  Juries,  Undermining Justice:  Lessons from  Criminal
Trials and Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 419, 434-35 (1999).
12.  U.S.  Sentencing  Comm'n, Mode  of Conviction in  U.S.  District Courts for  U.S.  Sentencing
Commission Guideline Cases, in SOURCEBOOK  CRIM.  JUST. STAT.  439 (2003).
13.  U.S.  SENTENCING  COMM'N,  U.S.  SENTENCING  GUIDELINES  MANUAL  § 5Kl.1  (2004)
("Substantial Assistance to Authorities").
14.  See generally Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and
the  Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87  CORNELL  L.  REv.  697  (2002);  Erica  G.  Franklin,  Waiving
Prosecutorial  Disclosures in the Guilty Plea  Process: A Debate on the Merits of  Discovery Waivers,
51  STAN. L. REv. 567 (1999).
15.  Rule  11  of the  Federal Rules  of Criminal  Procedure requires  that  before  accepting  a plea of
guilty,  the court must address  the defendant in open court  and ensure that  the defendant understands
the consequences  of pleading  guilty, and under Rule  11(d),  the court  must determine that the  plea  is
voluntary. FED. R. CRIM. P.  11,  11 (d).  But voluntariness  means understanding  the rights given up by
the  waiver of a jury trial.  With  few  exceptions, it does  not mean  understanding  all of the  collateral
consequences  of a guilty plea.  Cf  Padilla v. Kentucky,  130  S.Ct.  1473  (2010)  (setting  aside a plea
because  of  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  in  not  informing  the  defendant  of  the  immigration
consequences  of his guilty plea).
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protections  could  be  waived.'"  Put  simply,  in  the  "market"  for  pleas
nearly everything was subject to bargaining.
Even the public  ceremony of sentencing became formulaic.  There were
a  priori  rules,  the  federal  sentencing  guidelines,  but  they  were  often
arbitrary  and  hardly  accessible  to  the  public  in  any  meaningful  way."
While the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker's made the
federal  sentencing  guidelines  advisory,  too  often  incomprehensible
"guideline-speak"  still  dominated  the  sentencing  discourse.  Fifty-five
percent  of federal  sentences  still  fell  within  the  guideline  ranges. 19  The
public  space,  the  courtrooms  in  which  criminal trials  were to  have  been
held,  followed  the  now  familiar  ritual-pleading  to  the  charge,  then
pleading guilty, then sentencing.
The architects of the modem courthouses have striven to make room for
the jury with ever larger spaces to accommodate  the more expansive pool
from  which jurors  are  chosen,  now  that jury venires  seek  to  maximize
representation  of all  parts of the  society.  In  most  federal  courthouses,
there  is  one jury room per judge,  often  a  comfortable  and  airy  space  for
deliberation.  The design  of the  deliberation  rooms  in  the  courthouse  in
which  I  have  served  the  past  seventeen  years,  the  United  States
courthouse  in the  District of Massachusetts,  is particularly capacious  and
welcoming, but sadly, too often empty.
16.  United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d  14,  24-25 (1st  Cir. 2001). The Teeter test asks whether "(1)
the  written  plea agreement  clearly  delineates the  scope  of the  waiver;  (2)  the  district court  inquired
specifically  at the plea hearing  about any waiver of appellate  rights; and (3) the denial of the right to
appeal  would not constitute  a miscarriage  of  justice."  United  States v. Edelen,  539  F.3d 83,  85  (1st
Cir. 2008); see also United  States v. Isom,  580 F.3d 43,  50 (1st Cir. 2009); cf United States  v. Perez,
46 F.  Supp. 2d 59 (D. Mass.  1999) (stating that appeal waiver was against public policy).
17.  D. Brock Homby, Speaking in Sentences,  14 GREEN  BAG  147,  149 (2011).  As Judge Homby
noted:
When  Guidelines  were  mandatory,  federal  sentencing  hearings  were  surreal.  In  a  public
ceremonial  rite-where  the  most  important  thing  should  be  the  understanding  of the
defendant,  victims,  family,  friends  and community  observers-mandatory  Guidelines  stole
the  language  of  sentencing  from  citizens.  [Instead, judges  talked)  in  algebraic  formulae
("base offense  level under Guideline 2D  I.1  (c)(4), enhancement  for role  in the offense under
Guideline 3B1.1"); defendants  looked like deer caught in the headlights; and everyone else's
eyes  glazed  over.  Under mandatory  Guidelines,  little  was  left  to  say  after  the  formulaic
conclusions. Sentencing ranges  open for judicial discretion could be as little as 6 months.
Id. at  157  (citations  omitted)  (quoting  KATE  STITH  & Jost  A.  CABRANES,  FEAR  OF  JUDGING  85
(1998)).
18.  543 U.S.  220 (2005).
19.  U.S.  Sentencing  Comm'n,  Sentences  Within  and  Departing from  U.S.  Sentencing
Commission Guidelines in U.S. District  Courts, by  Primary  Offense, SOURCEBOOK CRIM.  JUST. STAT.
ONLINE (2011), available  at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5362010.pdf
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